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Abstract
Verbal and mathematical models that consider the costs and benefits of behavioral strategies have been useful in
explaining animal behavior and are often used as the basis of evolutionary explanations of human behavior. In most cases,
however, these models do not account for the effects that group structure and cultural traditions within a human
population have on the costs and benefits of its members’ decisions. Nor do they consider the likelihood that cultural as
well as genetic traits will be subject to natural selection. In this paper, we present an agent-based model that incorporates
some key aspects of human social structure and life history. We investigate the evolution of a population under conditions
of different environmental harshness and in which selection can occur at the level of the group as well as the level of the
individual. We focus on the evolution of a socially learned characteristic related to individuals’ willingness to contribute to
raising the offspring of others within their family group. We find that environmental harshness increases the frequency of
individuals who make such contributions. However, under the conditions we stipulate, we also find that environmental
variability can allow groups to survive with lower frequencies of helpers. The model presented here is inevitably a simplified
representation of a human population, but it provides a basis for future modeling work toward evolutionary explanations of
human behavior that consider the influence of both genetic and cultural transmission of behavior.
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Introduction
Many animals are adapted to survive in variable and
challenging environments, but only humans can make a living in
such a wide range of settings, from the savannah to the tropics,
from the scorching desert to the frozen tundra. Our ability to do so
stems not from our physical or mental prowess as individuals, but
from our ability to organize collectively, to cooperate, and to learn
from one another in a manner that produces cumulative
improvements and considerable diversity between human popu-
lations [1,2]. Much theory and research into human origins is now
focused on the characteristics that make it possible for human
groups to generate and share such a complex culture, character-
istics such as our highly developed ability to socially learn and our
inclination to share resources [3,4]. Social institutions and
psychological norms of behavior have guided our ability to
organize into cohesive cultural groups, shaping effective interac-
tions both within and between groups [5,6]. Increasingly, human
parenting behavior, which has been described as ‘‘cooperative
breeding’’ because allomaternal parental care is essential for the
raising of human young, is recognized as having played an
important role in the evolution of these characteristics [7–11].
Humans have a number of adaptations that facilitate the creation
and maintenance of family groups whose members contribute to
the raising of young. For example, humans have a unique life
history; it is common for females to live many years after they have
ceased to be fertile [12]. Thus human families usually include at
least one experienced mother with time to help look after other
women’s children. The longevity that makes grandparenting
possible is almost certainly underpinned by genetic adaptations.
However, other adaptations that serve to ensure mothers have
help raising young appear to be mostly cultural, such as the
marriage customs through which a sexual relationship and
responsibility for offspring are formally acknowledged. Caspari
and Lee [13] have also argued that the increased longevity of
modern humans was driven primarily by cultural and demo-
graphic factors rather than genetic factors, as indicated by the
human fossil record.
Understanding the features and dynamics of family structure
and group organization, with attention paid to lifespan stages, is
essential for gathering a complete picture of how modern humans
evolved. It is increasingly recognized that theoretical models
complement empirical work on evolution. Models provide a
formalization of theory and boundary conditions for hypothesis
formation. Analytical models typically focus on one small piece of
the ecological puzzle, while ignoring many environmental,
structural, and psychological details. This is partly for the purposes
of tractability but also in the interest of simplicity, both of analysis
and of parsimony. Nevertheless, the use of more complex
computational models can shed light on processes of organization
and evolution that are missed by simpler models. Spatial structure,
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temporal changes in social networks, lifespan-dependent aspects of
individual behavior, or extensive heterogeneity in the population
play important roles in the historical and evolutionary trajectories
of human groups.
A striking example of the importance of including heterogeneity
comes from a computational modeling study of the Anasazi, a now
extinct society native to the North American Southwest [14]. A
detailed agent-based model was built that was able to re-create
details of the population expansion and subsequent collapse.
However, the re-creation was only possible when age onsets for
fertility and death were made heterogeneous across agents. Thus,
a complex computational model may be justified when details such
as individual heterogeneity and sociospatial structure are impor-
tant to the dynamics under investigation.
Recently, Smaldino, Schank, and McElreath [15] presented a
spatial agent-based model of the evolution of cooperation in harsh
environments, in which increased environmental harshness was
modeled as an increased energy deduction (a ‘‘cost of living’’)
incurred by each agent at each time step. The model demonstrat-
ed that, although harsher environments caused cooperators to fare
worse than freeloaders in the short run, individuals with the
highest fitness were observed in emergent groups with high
concentrations of cooperators. Harsh conditions led to local
extinctions in regions where cooperators were scarce or not well
assorted. Most importantly, harsher environments led to higher
long-term frequencies of cooperators, lending theoretical support
to Kropotkin’s [16] proposal that harsh environments should select
for cooperation. Although harsh environments have previously
been shown to select for reduced parasitism [17,18], this was the
first model to show an increase in cooperation with increased
environmental harshness in which cooperative acts yielded positive
payoffs and defection consistently outperformed cooperation in
single interactions. These results depended on a model that
incorporated aspects of life history (mobility, varied social partners,
decoupled birth and death) and spatial structure, and as such
contained somewhat more biological realism than many game
theoretic models. Nevertheless, the model was still abstract in
many ways; sociospatial structure arose through random move-
ment and resources were obtained only through pairwise
interactions.
The study of recent human evolution, including our cultural
evolution, is likely to benefit from the development of a family of
models which are even more complex, incorporating aspects of
individual life history, social structure, social learning, and
behavioral institutions. Ideally, these models would be unified by
a common framework, which could be modified or adapted to
investigate a wide range of questions about how the evolution of
humans and their groups (families and wider groupings) resulted in
an animal with the characteristics we observe in modern humans.
The model we present in this paper is our first step toward
developing such a framework. It incorporates representations of
many elements of human life history and social structure found in
small-scale societies [19]. We use this model to study the evolution
of cooperation in a context which has a direct effect on fitness: in
the caring of young. We then define environmental harshness as
increasing costs of raising young relative to the availability of
resources.
Below, we will first discuss the role of cooperative breeding in
human evolution in more detail, followed by an overview of our
model structure. We will then present the model in more detail.
We will show that this more realistic model replicates the findings
of the previous model, but also illustrates how factors such as
genetic adaptability and seasonal variability in available resources
complicate the picture. We will conclude with a broad discussion
of future directions.
Human Cooperative Breeding
We can define cooperative breeding behavior as individuals exerting
costly parenting effort to contribute to the developmental success
of an infant or juvenile that is not their own offspring [20,21].
Among terrestrial vertebrates, this behavior is more common in
birds than mammals but has evolved independently in a number
of mammalian families [22,23]. Several authors argue that
humans can be considered cooperative breeders because, although
parenting behavior is highly culturally variable, in no culture do
mothers raise their children without help from others [7–10,24].
Hill and Hurtado [24], in their studies of contemporary South
American hunter-gatherer societies, found not only that cooper-
ative breeding behavior was ubiquitous, but also, crucially, that
husband-wife pairs were physically incapable of procuring
sufficient food for their offspring and themselves without help
from others. Moreover, they found that meat acquisition of Ache
hunters over a given 90-day period was often highly variable for
any given individual, as a result of illness, injury, or luck. Sharing
food resources between nuclear families was therefore necessary to
ensure the survival of young children.
These observations suggest that humans are more accurately
described as ‘‘cooperative breeders’’ than ‘‘biparental carers’’ as
has been suggested by several influential evolutionary psychologists
(e.g., [25]). Research in a number of small-scale subsistence
communities has shown that the death or absence of a child’s
father often had no effect on the survival or welfare of the child
[10,26]. Presumably, in these subsistence societies contributions
from the child’s other kin and individuals who are unrelated but
allied with the family are able to compensate for the lack of
paternal contributions. For many parents living in economically
developed large-scale societies, extended kin groups are no longer
essential for raising children, but technology and the extensive
networks of cooperation and division of labor in these societies
have reduced the physical effort required for acquiring food. Also,
state institutions such as education and health care systems provide
considerable assistance to mothers raising their children.
It is likely that hominins have been raising their children
cooperatively for some time [8]. The large brains of humans
inevitably make our offspring costly to raise because the growth
and development of brain tissue requires high levels of energy and
nutrients [27]. Van Schaik and colleagues have argued that the
increased encephalization of the hominin line would not have
been possible unless females were receiving help provisioning their
young [28]. In particular, cooperative breeding has been identified
as a potentially crucial factor in the evolution of human
prosociality and our tremendous cognitive advantage over our
nearest relatives, the great apes [8,29]. Early Homo fossils are also
the earliest hominin fossils to be found associated with the drier,
more heterogeneous environments which began to expand in
Africa at the beginning of the Pleistocene [30,31]. In these harsher
environments natural selection might have favored cooperation in
the raising of young. Scarcity of water sources would have placed
considerable stress on lactating females because human milk, like
the milk of all primates, is very dilute [32,33].
Environmental Harshness and Cooperative Breeding
We present a model that includes certain key aspects of human
life history and social structure for modern humans that are likely
to have existed during the time of the last glaciation. This was a
time of climate instability that paleoclimate data suggests was more
extreme than that which occurred earlier in the Pleistocene [34]. It
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was also during this time that Homo sapiens began to spread out of
Africa, and the first evidence of the sustained accumulation of
highly complex culture appears. To have survived in these
conditions, human groups would have had to be nomadic
hunter-gatherers, and we envisage that they would have had the
egalitarian norms observed in contemporary nomadic hunter-
gatherers [35]. Research on such societies suggests that this
egalitarianism reduces mating-related competition among males to
a modest fraction of their total acquired resources [36].
Humans have a number of physical adaptations to harsh
tropical and subtropical environments such as savannas and
deserts. For example, our lack of body hair, increased ability to
perspire, and the dark skin pigmentation still found among
humans living in such climates likely facilitated the exodus from
the forest to the savanna [37]. The subsequent migration to cooler
temperate and subarctic environments presented a suite of new
adaptive challenges – adequate clothing and shelter, storage of
food against seasonal shortfalls, and the need to rely more on
hunting due to fewer edible plant resources. Expansion into such
environments also likely necessitated an increased reliance on
sharing time, attention, and food resources in the rearing of
children, including genetically unrelated children [24,29]. To
judge from the size of language groups, extra-tropical people often
had larger societies, perhaps to cope with greater environmental
harshness and increased risks [38]. Male contribution to the diet
increases with increasing latitude [39]. Larger group sizes may also
have been necessary to sustain more advanced technologies
required in harsher climates [40] and avoid catastrophic losses in
technologies seen when populations suddenly shrank [41–44].
Thus, the evidence suggests that many adaptations to harsher
environments as humans left Africa were cultural in nature,
concerning both individual behavior and group organization.
Our model will focus on how cultural norms of cooperative
breeding spread in a population of agents through the process of
natural selection when direct transmission is cultural rather than
genetic (i.e., cooperative behavior is learned). We assume that as
environmental harshness increases, so does the effort that must be
exerted to successfully raise an infant to adulthood (i.e., effort
exerted in providing food, care and attention). We will then
explore how additional factors such as constraints on the ability to
genetically adapt and yearly variability in environmental harshness
mediate the evolution of cooperative breeding.
There are fitness costs associated with contributing alloparent-
ing effort, which should be greatest for reproductive age females.
Those mothers who contribute effort to raising other females’
children will be able to devote less effort to raising her own. In the
case of males and post-reproductive females, the costs will be
smaller, if not nonexistent. Devoting more effort to parenting will
increase risk of injury and disease, and thus reduce life expectancy.
Cooperation is also likely to reap benefits, however, such as when
a hunter is given preferential access to court a young woman after
sharing food with her mother and sisters. For males, contributions
to cooperative breeding will tend to come from reduced
contributions to mating effort. Many processes may explain how
evolution solved the dilemma of cooperation inherent in reduced
male mating competition in our species [45]. Our future work will
include a comparison of culturally transmitted strategies to adjust
the costs and benefits of contributing parenting effort. In this
introductory model, we will assume that cooperation is costly for
reproductive-age females but that there is no net cost for other
cooperating adults.
A Model for the Evolution of Human Family
Groups
This section provides a basic description of the model. More
technical details following the ODD protocol for describing agent-
based models [46] can be found in Appendix S1. The design of
our model is as follows. Individuals live together in family groups,
which compete for resources as the overall environment has a
finite carrying capacity. Within each group are children and adults
delineated by sex, age, genetic quality (a measure of their ability to
acquire resources and stave off infection), and whether or not they
are a cooperator. Children are linked to their mothers, who must
acquire sufficient resources through their own efforts and the
contributions of the members of their group to raise their children
to adulthood. Upon leaving childhood behind, young adults can
begin to acquire resources of their own, and thus may contribute
to the raising of children within their family group. Young adults
also attempt to find a mate. When a marriage occurs, the female
leaves her natal family group and joins the group of her husband.
Each year, cooperators contribute substantial effort to collective
childrearing. Uncooperative ‘‘freeloaders’’ contribute much less. If
a mother cannot acquire enough resources to care for one of her
children, the child dies. Death can also occur from illness; the risk
of succumbing to illness is linked to a genetic trait, which a child
inherits from her parents. An individual’s genes reflect her
physiological adaptedness to her environment, and so also affect
the amount of effort (in terms of food, time, and attention) she can
provide toward childrearing. Whether or not an individual
becomes a cooperator is learned during childhood from the adults
in the natal family group.
Individuals in our model have a life course consistent with the
life history observed in contemporary foraging populations [19].
They are born, grow up, mate, produce young, and die within
family groups. Individuals are assigned the following characteris-
tics:
1. Sex, assigned at birth with 50 percent probability of being
female.
2. Age, 0 to 100, with chance of mortality changing over the
lifespan. Children become adults at the age of 18, and adults
become non-reproductive elders at the age of 50.
3. Family group membership, assigned at birth but, for females,
may change at marriage as females join the family groups of
their mates.
4. Genetic quality, a continuous variable that influences the
chances of survival and ability to gain resources, assigned at
birth and based on mean of genetic quality of an individual’s
parents plus error.
5. Cooperativity, a socially learned characteristic assigned to
agents when they reach adulthood. The probability of being a
cooperator is equal to the frequency of cooperators in one’s
natal family group at age 18. Adult cooperators contribute a
large portion of their resources to the family group for the
support of offspring.
Family groups consist of children, unmarried adults, parents,
and elders. All individuals become one year older at each time step
and follow a lifecycle that reflects the acquisition and consumption
of resources and mortality risks observed in hunter-gatherer
groups [47]. Child-rearing imposes a cost on family groups
because children require care and provisioning. This cost is paid
by the child’s mother, and by alloparental contributions from the
group. In harsher environments, alloparental contributions are
required to sustain childrearing. The cost is maximal at birth and
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gradually decreases as a child needs less care and learns to acquire
resources for itself. At 18, children become adults and cease to be a
cost to their group, beginning instead to contribute resources to
support children in the family group. Individuals’ contributions
increase as they age until mid-life (the age of elderhood) and then
decline. Each year, agents have a risk of dying. The risk is high in
the first year and then decreases, remaining stable throughout
adulthood and then increasing again past the age of elderhood.
Each individual has a genetic quality, q, which reflects the degree
to which his or her physiological characteristics are adapted to the
environment. This adaptiveness includes the ability to ward off
illness and to secure available resources that could be contributed
for childrearing (e.g., food, time, and attention). Genetic quality is
represented by a real number between 0 and 1 and is an inherited
trait derived from the genetic qualities of an individual’s parents
(see details in Appendix S1). To simulate a population’s migration
into a novel and harsh environment, we can limit individuals’
ability to evolve high levels of genetic quality, resulting in the need
to adapt culturally. This reflects the observation that cultural traits
can evolve much more quickly than genetic traits [48,49], which
accounts in part for the tremendous success of the human species
across a wide variety of environments.
Individuals also have a binary cooperativity trait (i.e., they are
either a cooperator or a defector), which represents their
willingness to contribute resources to their family group toward
the raising of children. An individual is assigned this trait at the age
of adulthood with a probability equal to the proportion of
cooperator adults in his natal family group. So the cultural
transmission of cooperative behavior is unbiased in the sense that
the probabilistic method we describe is mathematically equivalent
to choosing an individual at random and copying her, but biased in
the sense that that random individual is selected only from within
an agent’s natal family group [48]. The assumption that
cooperative behavior is socially learned and unbiased within an
agent’s family group has an important consequence: cooperation
will increase if families with more cooperators have more offspring,
regardless of whether the parents of those offspring are cooper-
ators themselves. We made this assumption for simplicity but it
can be relaxed in future models aimed at assessing the influence of
more complex mechanisms of cultural transmission.
In addition to cooperating, kin and other social relations may
also compete with one another for resources [50,51]. To some
extent, this is endogenously captured in the model by the fact that
family groups have limited carrying capacities. It is well known
that kin effects may also aid the evolution of cooperation. We do
not model kin effects explicitly, but because family members will
tend to be more closely related than individuals of different family
groups, kin-biased cooperation is endogenously driven through the
mechanism of positive assortment [52].
Each simulation was initialized so that each family group had an
equal number of individuals of each sex and equal numbers from
each of the four age categories (children, unwed adults, parents,
and elders) whose ages were randomly assigned within the
associated limits. Individuals with higher or lower genetic quality
and cooperativity were randomly distributed in the population so
that some families started with higher mean genetic quality and a
higher proportion of cooperators than others. An illustration of the
population structure is given in Fig. 1.
Once initialized, the model schedule proceeds by performing
the following five stages in order at each time step (notionally a
year):
1. Matchmaking: Unmarried adults search for mates and, if paired,
females migrate to their mate’s family group.
2. Family Fissioning: Large family groups split and spread into
unused territory, if available. If no territory is available, groups
don’t split.
3. Resource Contributions: Adults contribute resources toward
helping eligible females raise children, with cooperators
contributing considerably more.
4. Childbirth, Childrearing, and Child Death: Married females with
sufficient resources produce offspring, and children die due to
lack of resources, illness, or chance events.
5. Adult Aging and Death: Adults age and eventually die.
1. Matchmaking. Unmarried adults are randomly paired
with an unmarried member of the opposite sex from another
family. An individual i agrees to marry individual j with a
probability that increases with j’s genetic quality, reflecting the
increased desirability (attractiveness) of mates with ‘‘good genes’’
[25,53,54]. If both agree to the match, the female moves to the
family group of her spouse. If either does not agree, the individuals
remain unmarried. As individuals age, the strictness with which
preferences constrain the acceptance of a potential mate decreases,
so older agents are more willing to marry agents of lower genetic
quality. This mate choice rule generates assortment for genetic
quality [55] while ensuring that most agents eventually find a
mate. Full details of the mating algorithm can be found in
Appendix S1. We assume that individuals use relatively simple
heuristics, rather than complex optimizing strategies, in selecting a
mate. This is based on research that suggests not only that humans
often employ simple decision strategies, but also that these
heuristics are often quite effective across a wide range of conditions
[56,57]. We note that other criteria not included here may be
involved in mate choice procedures, including homophily, family
reputation, and individual personality traits such as charm and
agreeableness. Our modeling framework has been developed so
that different mating strategies can be easily implemented in future
investigations.
2. Family Fissioning. Family groups live on patches, each of
which has a maximum carrying capacity. When a family size
exceeds half the patch carrying capacity, the group attempts to
split if there is a free patch available, a situation that occurs when a
patch’s previous occupying group has died out due to an inability
to raise sufficient children to maturity to offset their local death
rate. If fissioning occurs, males and females from each class of
adults (unmarried adults, parents, and elders) divide evenly
between the two new family groups. Children accompany their
mothers. Individuals are therefore subject to group-level selection.
Successful family groups flourish as unsuccessful groups become
extinct.
3. Resource Collection and Contribution. To raise chil-
dren, a mother needs more resources than she can collect on her
own, so the raising of children requires resource contributions by
other family members [24,47]. The amount of resources available
to an individual at a given time is determined by her age and
genetic quality. Individuals contribute some of their collected
resources to the married reproductive-aged females in the family
group for re-allocation to children. The proportion of resources
contributed is determined by whether or not one is a cooperator.
Cooperators contribute 90 percent of their resources, defectors
contribute only 10 percent. Keep in mind that because resources
are divided among only the child-bearing females, such females
who are also cooperators often recoup resources in excess of their
contributions as long as there are sufficient cooperators in their
family group. Still, within groups non-cooperative mothers will
have relatively more resources to contribute to their offspring than
will cooperative mothers. We assume that the resources available
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for donation are in excess of what an individual needs for personal
survival, and for simplicity, non-donated resources kept by males
and women without dependent children does not influence their
chance of survival. Future work will explore the trade-offs of
differential resource usage for other fitness-affecting purposes.
4. Childbirth, Childrearing, and Child
Death. Reproductive-age females allocate the resources con-
tributed to them to the production and rearing of offspring. Those
who already have children first allocate resources to sustain them.
If there are insufficient resources, the youngest child dies, with the
next-youngest dying if there are still insufficient resources for the
remaining children, and so on. The base cost of childrearing, b, is
equal to the cost of giving birth. The cost of supporting a child in
any one year is derived from the baseline cost of childrearing, b,
and decreases as the child ages (see Appendix S1 for details). The
value of b is a metric of environmental harshness, representing the
costs of childrearing relative to the resources available to the
population. If a married adult female has more resources than
needed to sustain her children (if any), she can reproduce if the size
of the family group she belongs to is less than the patch’s carrying
capacity. The genetic quality of a newborn child is the mean of its
parents’ genetic quality plus error. Newborns are equally likely to
be male or female. Each child has a nonzero probability of dying
each year, determined by its age and genetic quality. Children who
survive 18 years become adults.
5. Adult Aging and Death. Each adult agent also has a
nonzero probability of dying each year, which is a function of its
age and genetic quality. If an agent does not die, it continues to
age. Agents who survive 50 years enter elderhood, after which the
females no longer produce offspring (and neither do the males, as,
for simplicity, we assume all mating occurs within marriage), and
the probability of death for both male and females begins to
increase. If an agent survives 100 years, its probability of death is
one.
For the simulation runs presented below, the initial genetic
quality of the population was normally distributed with a mean of
0.5 and a standard deviation of approximately 0.24, capped
between 0 and 1. The initial frequency of cooperators in the
population was 0.5 unless otherwise stated. Our results are
averaged from 50 runs of each condition, each of which was run
for 104 time steps.
Results
Harshness due to increased costs of childrearing
Environmental harshness, in the form of increased costs of
childrearing, was positively correlated with the long-term frequen-
cy of cooperators (Fig. 2A) but not with the genetic quality of the
population (Fig. 2B). Genetic quality was associated with survival
as well as resource production, and so was always positively
selected for irrespective of the costs of childrearing. Figure 3 shows
the model dynamics for three levels of environmental harshness.
Genetic quality increased in all cases, but the frequency of
cooperators increased only in the top row, when the cost of
childrearing was greatest (b=100), and fell in the other two cases,
with a larger fall associated with lower costs. High childrearing
costs also led to an early dip in the population size, when the
family groups with few cooperators died out. This was followed by
a recovery as the surviving family groups expanded. When the cost
of childrearing was too high, recovery from this population dip was
sometimes impossible, leading to complete population collapse
(Fig. 2C). Note that while the genetic quality in the population rose
rapidly due to relatively high rates of mutation, the overall results
were qualitatively unchanged when the mutation rate was lowered
and hence genetic quality took longer to increase.
These results extend the findings of Smaldino et al. [15] and
show that the theory of the evolution of cooperation in harsh
environments developed therein – regions with few cooperators
perish, leading to the survival of groups with higher number of
cooperators as environmental costs increase – is robust in the sense
described by Levins [58]. We show here that this result holds
regardless of whether cooperation is transmitted vertically from
Figure 1. An illustration of the individual and group structure of the model. There are a number of family groups, each of which contains a
unique set of agents. Unmarried agents are colored, married agents are grey. Because children’s lives are attached to their mothers’ until they reach
adulthood, children are not shown. Each agent is characterized by sex, age, marital status, cooperativity, and genetic quality.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g001
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parent to offspring or socially learned though unbiased transmis-
sion from an individual’s larger social group.
Genetic quality increased to approach its maximum value
regardless of environmental harshness (transmission error kept it
from reaching unity), but even when the cost of childrearing was at
its highest, the long-range frequency of cooperators was never
greater than around 0.7. Cooperator frequency rose to its highest
peak early in each run (if it rose at all) and fell back as the mean
genetic quality of the population increased because individuals of
higher genetic quality were able to acquire more resources.
When the cost of childrearing was high, the population fell
sharply during the first few generations as family groups with fewer
cooperators and/or lower genetic quality perished. Only groups
with a minimum threshold of cooperators could survive, so the
frequency of cooperators increased rapidly. Eventually, though, as
natural selection increased the genetic quality in the population,
family groups needed fewer cooperators, and individual-level
selection against cooperators decreased the cooperator frequency.
The top row of Fig. 3 is consolidated and summarized in Fig. 4,
which highlights the dynamics under high costs of childbirth.
Harshness due to reduced genetic adaptability
In the baseline model, we assumed that, through the process of
natural selection on genes, individual physiologies could adapt
quite well to their environments, and maximize an individual’s
ability to acquire resources and stave off infection. The generality
of this assumption is limited, however. As anatomically modern
humans spread out of the tropics into colder, harsher environ-
ments, it is unlikely that they could quickly adapt genetically.
Indeed, even today, humans who live near the Arctic Circle
require a host of cumulative cultural innovations and ingroup
cooperation in order to survive in the tundra [1]. Here we
considered limitations to individuals’ ability to evolve their genetic
quality. To do this, we imposed a maximum genetic quality c#1,
and initialized the population with a mean genetic quality of c/2.
The initial model presented above was recovered when c=1.
In all cases, the previously described patterns of an early
increase in cooperation followed by a small decrease and
stabilization were seen whenever the cost of childrearing was
high, and a decrease in cooperation followed by a stabilization was
observed when the cost of childrearing was low (Fig. 5A). These
results were also accompanied by an early drop in the population
size followed by recovery and stabilization in the former case, and
an absence of a drop in the latter case (Fig. 5B). Predictably, the
organism-environment adaptive fit also affected the evolution of
cooperation. In particular, the long-term frequency of cooperators
was higher when c was lower, since more cooperation was needed
to survive. When the cost of childrearing was high, lower c led to
more dramatic initial dips in the population size and to smaller
long-term population sizes at recovery. Figure 5C summarizes the
relationships between maximum genetic quality, cost of child-
rearing, and cooperator frequency. The former two appear to
have additive influence on the latter, which makes sense because
both factors directly influence the relative contributions needed for
childrearing. Figure 5D shows the proportion of runs for which the
population completely collapsed as a function of c for the cost of
childrearing b=100 and b=75. All runs survived for b=50.
Harshness due to variability in the costs of childrearing
An environment may be harsh in the sense that a key resource,
such as water, is in short supply. As long as the environment is
stable, however, organisms can develop adaptations to cope with
environmental limits and this will have the effect of reducing
harshness. Highly variable environments remain harsh because
static adaptations, whether genetic or cultural, cannot keep up
with environmental changes. For example, the availability of
resources may vary if the climate is highly volatile or if competition
between species causes rapid fluctuation in population sizes. As a
result, both the absolute and relative fitness of individuals will
fluctuate in turn. Environmental variability can be an important
force in population collapse, as the struggle for existence increases
and individual adaptations are no longer adequate or well-honed
for survival [40,59,60].
The presence of cooperative breeding in some non-human
species has been observed to correlate with temporal variability in
environmental conditions [61,62], which supplements the intuition
that environmental variability may have contributed to coopera-
tive breeding practices in humans. To test this in the context of our
Figure 2. Long-term results of the model at t=104, as a
function of the baseline cost of raising a child, b. (A) The
population cooperator frequency, and (B) the mean genetic quality in
the population. Error bars are standard deviations. (C) The percent of
runs in which the population did not go extinct.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g002
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Figure 3. Model dynamics. The three rows reflect three different costs of childbirth. The left graphs reflect the average genetic quality in the
population (in red) and the frequency of cooperators (in blue). The right graphs are the total population size. The dark lines are averages across 50
runs (or all runs in which the population did not go extinct), the shaded regions are standard deviations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g003
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model, we added a noise term n to the cost of childrearing (which
forms the basis for the cost of rearing children of any age), so that
in any given year, the new cost was
b’~bzn,
where n was a random number drawn from a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation sn.
This variability in the cost of childrearing represents yearly
environmental fluctuations in the proportion of resources gathered
that are required to successfully rear offspring. It is worth noting
that there are many types of environmental variability, and many
ways to model them [48,60,63,64]. Our intent here was not to
include a comprehensive analysis on cooperation in variable
environments, but rather to show that such variability could be
easily added to our model and to assess the influence of one such
instantiation on the evolution of cooperation.
We found that, counter to our expectations, yearly variability in
the costs of childrearing led to a small decrease in the average long-
term frequency of cooperators in the population as long as the
average cost of childrearing was moderate-to-high (Fig. 6). This is
because children are most costly at birth, and the relative cost of
childrearing decreases as children age. Groups that lack sufficient
resources to produce new offspring during an average year may
nevertheless do so during a year when the costs are below average.
Although costs will also rise above average with equal likelihood,
children born during a low-cost year will by this time be older and
therefore less costly. In this way, groups can survive with fewer
Figure 4. Model dynamics under high costs of childrearing
(b=100).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g004
Figure 5. Model dynamics and long-term outcomes for varying maximum genetic quality, c. (A) The mean cooperator frequency and (B)
population size as a function of time for several values of c and b. (C) The mean 6SD cooperator frequency as a function of c for several values of b.
(D) Percent runs survived as a function of c when b= 100 and b= 75.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g005
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cooperators when costs of childrearing are variable than when
costs are constant. This decrease in cooperator frequency due to
variability is, however, quite small compared with the increases
due to higher costs of childrearing and diminished adaptive fit, as
seen by comparing Fig. 6 with Figs 2A and 5C.
For very low average costs of childrearing (b,40), variability led
to a small increase in cooperator frequency. However, this result is
misleading. Very low values of b produce a floor effect, because b’
cannot drop below zero. This means that when the average cost of
childrearing is very small, the expected value of b’ will be greater
than b, and it is this increase in the average cost of childrearing,
rather than variability per se, that drives the increase in cooperator
frequency.
Initial conditions and population structure
All of the results presented so far are based on runs initialized
with 50% cooperators. However, if we assume that the start of a
simulation run represents a sudden increase in environmental
harshness (such as that which must have often been experienced
by our ancestors during the climatic instability of the most recent
glaciation), it may be more realistic to assume that cooperators are
initially rare. We therefore tested the model’s robustness to
different initial cooperator frequencies. We found that the long-
term results were largely insensitive to the initial cooperator
frequency. Neither the frequency of cooperators nor the mean
genetic quality at t=104 were influenced at all by the initial
cooperator frequency. In other words, if cooperators were initially
rare, their numbers increased, and if cooperators were initially
common, their numbers decreased. The initial cooperator
frequency was, however, an important factor in whether the
population survived the early crash when the cost of childrearing
was high (Fig. 7A). With too few cooperators, family groups could
not muster the resources to survive. This suggests that even with
relatively low average costs, high levels of cooperation would be
favored by group selection if environments occasionally experi-
enced severe increases in harshness.
If, on the other hand, the population was generally more
cooperative and consisted of individuals of higher genetic quality,
it should be better able to withstand population ‘‘crashes’’ (see
Fig. 3) and hence survive in harsher environments. To test this, we
initialized the population with 90% cooperators and with a modal
genetic quality equal to 1.0 (with a mean of 0.86, achieved by
setting ,gi.= gˆ, see Appendix S1). As expected, the population
was able to weather harsher storms (Fig. 7B), even though the
long-term frequency of cooperators was unaffected (among runs in
which the population survived).
Our results were also robust to changes in the population
structure, including fewer family groups and a smaller maximum
family size (in either case the total population size was smaller, and
therefore more fragile). For the former, we tested 30 vs. 80 family
groups. For the latter, we tested a maximum family size of 150 vs.
300. None of these factors had any qualitative effects on our
results. Our results were also unchanged if males rather than
females left their natal groups at marriage.
Discussion
We have presented a model of social evolution in a population
of agents with a family group structure and individual life history
roughly similar to that of humans living in small family-based
communities – the kind of social environment in which almost all
humans lived for most of their evolutionary history. The model
examines the effect of environmental harshness on the frequency
of a socially learned trait, to be an alloparent. The findings build
on those of Smaldino et al. [15] and show that harsh environments
Figure 6. Variability in the costs of childrearing. The difference in
cooperator frequency at t=104 between noisy and noiseless environ-
ments, as calculated by the mean cooperator frequency without noise
subtracted from the mean cooperator frequency with noise. For these
runs, c=0.8 and sn= 10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g006
Figure 7. Influences on population survival. (A) The percent of
runs in which the population survived as a function of the initial
cooperator frequency, for b = 100. (B) The effect of both high
cooperator frequency and high genetic quality on population survival
for high costs of childrearing compared with the baseline model. Initial
conditions in the ‘‘high fitness’’ condition were a cooperator frequency
of 90% and a mean genetic quality of 0.86, compared with 50%
cooperators and mean genetic quality of 0.5 in the baseline condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080753.g007
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select for a long-term increase in cooperation but in conditions
based on assumptions that are more realistic and related to human
biology and social structure. In this case, cooperation was specific
to the context of raising children, and environmental harshness
was defined as either an increase in the costs of childrearing or as a
decrease in the ability to genetically evolve adaptive traits. This
second definition of harshness is particularly pertinent to the
evolution of social norms and institutions as anatomically modern
humans spread throughout the globe starting in the Paleolithic,
because the evolution of genetic traits is a relatively slow process
compared with the potential speed of cultural evolution [48,49].
The ability to learn new behaviors and transmit them through
social learning, particularly when those behaviors are related to
widespread cooperation, has likely been one of the most significant
factors in the success of the human species [1,3].
Variability in resource availability (or, equivalently, variability
in costs requiring the use of those resources) may be characterized
as another form of environmental harshness. Certainly, it increases
the uncertainty faced by an organism, and can introduce complex
selection dynamics, since what is most adaptive may change from
year to year [65]. Our results show that normal variation in the
yearly cost of childrearing can, counterintuitively, decrease the
need for cooperation. This effect was driven by the fact that the
costs of rearing a child decreased as the child aged. As far as we
can tell, this is a previously undocumented ‘‘economic’’ phenom-
enon: when the investment cost for a resource decreases over time,
variation in the available investment capital facilitates the
development of that resource. Nevertheless, cooperation in many
species appears to increase under increased resource variability
[61,62], which should give us pause in the interpretation of these
results. Yearly variability in resources may be better modeled as a
skewed distribution in which the costs of childrearing do not
substantially decrease from the median values, but in which
occasional catastrophic events can significantly raise those costs. In
these cases, the mean cost of childrearing would increase relative
to the median cost, which our model predicts would increase
cooperation. Furthermore, our model does not account for
variability on shorter time scales, such as when some individuals
fail to acquire resources due to illness, injury, or luck.
Limitations and Future directions
Like all such models, this one provides only a rough
approximation of conditions existing in a small-scale human
society. The challenge faced by all modeling endeavors is that, to
achieve meaningful results, simplicity and parsimony must be
balanced by sufficient complexity and realism [66]. This model
allows us to observe effects in a system in which natural selection is
working on both individuals and groups (families) when charac-
teristics can be transmitted both genetically and through social
learning. Because of this, its basic framework has the potential to
provide a better way of testing ideas about human evolution. It
allows us to assess the long-term effects on fitness of variations in
individual-level traits (transmitted genetically or through social
learning) and group-level traits, such as social institutions.
We envisage this model to be the basis of a family of models into
which parameters can be introduced and their values adjusted
depending on the aspects of human behavior, biology or social
organization which are of interest. Most mathematical and verbal
models of the evolution of social traits consider costs and benefits
only in terms of competition between individuals for food, for
mates, or for the survival of offspring (e.g., [67,68]). While this is
valid in non-human species, it does not take into account the fact
that human groups use socially transmitted institutions of reward
and punishment to manipulate the costs and benefits its members
face. These institutions are group-level characteristics and they are
subject to natural selection because groups with the more effective
institutions will be more successful [2,6]. Thus, an explanation of
the evolution of our unique species requires more complex models,
accounting for details at multiple levels of organization and for the
coevolution of genes and culture. We have presented this model as
the first stage in an effort to create models that capture aspects of
the processes of human social evolution that are underrepresented
in the current literature, with a particular focus on the importance
of cooperation in the context of childrearing. Painting a fuller and
richer picture with future modeling work will likely require the
incorporation of additional details and nuances of human life
history, social institutions, and social structure.
One noteworthy limitation was that our model did not
investigate sex differences related to social learning and coopera-
tivity. In our model, males and non-reproductive females did not
incur any costs for cooperating, leading to neutral selection on
cooperativity at the individual level. This contrasts with the
negative individual-level selection on cooperativity for reproduc-
tive females (cooperation was always favored at the group level).
Cooperative strategies, however, were socially learned via
unbiased transmission by averaging across the strategies of all
adults in the family group, regardless of sex. This obscures
differences in fitness for male and female cooperators, and also
ignores evidence suggesting that, in at least some contexts, children
preferentially learn from adults and other children of their own sex
[69–71]. An important avenue for future research is the
investigation of sex-biased learning strategies and the emergent
differences in male and female patterns of cooperativity.
Even more important is deeper investigation into the cooper-
ative dilemmas associated with cooperative breeding and how they
are managed in humans. The term ‘‘cooperative breeding’’ is used
to describe the parenting behaviors of many animal species, but
discussion of how these relate to theoretical concepts of
cooperation is only beginning [72]. In humans, no forms of
cooperation, including cooperation in the raising of young, can be
understood without considering culturally evolved traits and their
effects at the individual and group levels. Models such as the one
we describe here, which look at the coevolution of genetic and
cultural traits, will play an important role in developing this
understanding. Our modeling framework has vast potential for
probing deep questions related to the complexities involved in
human social evolution. In addition to those already discussed, the
following are some promising directions for future research.
N Sex- or age-based division of labor. What would be the effect of
groups developing traditions of varying the level of alloparent-
ing contribution by sex, age, or reproductive status? For
example, what if mothers with young were not expected to
contribute alloparenting effort?
N Changes in life history parameters. In the present model, individuals
have the same life history as observed in modern humans, with
non-reproductive periods at the beginning and end of life.
These non-reproductive periods are unique to humans,
however, and may have evolved in the context of cooperative
breeding families. By modifying this model we can look at the
condition which may have favored changes to the human life
history.
N Parenting strategies. In this model, it is assumed that the
likelihood of an agent being a cooperator is influenced only
by the proportion of cooperators in the group. In modifications
to the model we can investigate how parenting strategies may
introduce other influences.
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N Mate choice strategies. Current models which consider the
evolution of mate choice assume it to be an individual
decision, ignoring the evidence that extended families have
historically played a large role in mate decisions [73–76]. How
might different mate choice strategies developed at the group
level affect fitness of the group and individual? How do
conflicts between individual and family-level preferences play
out over the long term?
N Wealth accumulation, bride prices, and dowries. Individual or families
could accumulate wealth and use it to influence mate choice
and the reproductive success of descendants.
N Institutions of social enforcement. Individuals within families could
punish non-cooperators either directly, by actively taking away
resources, or indirectly, by withholding future aid. Institutions
of social enforcement likely played an important role in the
evolution of human social groups [77,78].
N Complex strategies. Individuals could play probabilistic or
contingent strategies to decide whether to cooperate. Families
may form alliances, or individuals from different families might
form friendship networks to help one another in times of need.
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